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ARTICLE REVIEW

THE VALUE OF RECODING WITHIN REASON:
A REVIEW OF JUSTIN HUGHES'
"RECODING" INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
OVERLOOKED AUDIENCE INTERESTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his Article, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests,' Justin Hughes2 inspires readers to consider
more broadly all aspects of audience interests. Hughes introduces
the valid theory that the vast majority of listeners craves stability
in cultural objects3 and does not want the responsibility to recode.4
This majority opinion, according to Hughes, negates the need for
greater recoding freedom to alter the meanings of messages.
Hughes' Article presents a provocative analysis of the debate
between high-protectionists5 and Deconstructionists.6
He
1. Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REv. 923 (1999) (arguing the majority of the
consumer audience seeks stability of meaning in cultural objects).
2. At the time of publication, Justin Hughes served as Advisor to the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, Department of Commerce. He received his
Juris Doctor in 1986 from Harvard. See id. at 923.
3. For the purposes of this Review, "cultural object" does not have a strictly
tangible definition. An intangible work such as a persona or a cartoon may
qualify as a cultural object.
4. For the purposes of this Review, "recode" refers to the alteration by
secondary users of intellectual property's primary intended meaning. In his
Article, Hughes often questions whether certain behavior is actually recoding.
See Hughes, supra note 1, at 943-44 (questioning whether gay men recoded
Judy Garland's image or whether they simply relied on Garland's then-current
image of a troubled, misunderstood person).
5. In the realm of intellectual property law, "high protectionists" generally
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challenges Deconstructionists who advocate narrower intellectual
property protections to further justify their stance.7 This work is
undoubtedly. valuable to the discussion of the future course of U.S.
intellectual property protections. Unfortunately, however, Hughes
overlooks the importance of some recoding freedom as a tool
necessary for valuable cultural revolution.
Part II of this Review summarizes "Recoding" Intellectual
Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, highlighting Hughes'
assertions that most people prefer stability of meaning of cultural
objects and his critique of Deconstructionist arguments for
restriction .of intellectual property protections. Part III of this
Review analyzes Hughes' main arguments, supporting the
possibility that the majority of audience members initially prefers
that intellectual property ("IP") retain its predictable meaning, and
challenges some of Hughes' themes where he may have unfairly
dismissed valid Deconstructionist arguments.
Part IV also
challenges Hughes' ideas by providing a case example of how
recoding freedom can spur a passive audience into reconsidering
its initial stance and to see, upon further examination, the value of
recoding. The medium for this message is the past controversy
surrounding publication of Alice Randall's The Wind Done Gone,
an "unauthorized parody" 8 of Margaret Mitchell's wildly popular
classic, Gone With the Wind.9 Finally, Part V of this Review
advocate strong protections for intellectual property owners while "low
protectionists" advocate narrower protections to allow for greater access to
works, ideas, and expression.
6. See supra note 5. Deconstructionists fall into the realm of "low
protectionists."
7. Other authors support Hughes' critique of the Deconstructionist view that

intellectual property laws grant unhealthy control to individual owners, e.g. R.
Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 995 (2003) (concluding that

control conferred by intellectual property laws results in a richer public domain,
as opposed to draining the public domain as critics of intellectual property rights

contend).
8. The term "unauthorized parody" appears on The Wind Done Gone book
jacket.
9. ALICE RANDALL,

THE WIND DONE GONE

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/2

(2001) (retelling Margaret

2

LaVoi: The Value of Recoding Within Reason: A Review of Justin Hughes' "

2004]

THE VALUE OFRECODING

acknowledges the validity of arguments presented by both low and
high protectionists and, to strike a balance, proposes a system of
"Recoding within Reason." To achieve a measured system in
which freedom to recode exists while the stability of meaning is
not completely vulnerable, U.S. legislators should clarify
copyright Fair Use, further develop Fair Use legislation in the
realm of trademark law, and expand the Public Figure Doctrine.

II.

ARTICLE OVERVIEW

This overview of "Recoding" Intellectual Property and
Overlooked Audience Interests recapitulates Hughes' global
themes.1" First, this section introduces Hughes' underlying thesis
and motivation. It then focuses on Hughes' explanation of the
personhood interests inherent in intellectual property. Thirdly, this
Part discusses Hughes' contention that Deconstructionist
arguments overlook the interests of recipients as cultural listeners,
as opposed to re-issuers of cultural messages. This section next
outlines Hughes' arguments that audiences both gain and lose
utility in the recoding of cultural objects. Then, this section
highlights Hughes' exploration of our current intellectual property
protections and a hypothetical legal system in which the reliance
interests of listeners would frustrate owners' valid interests.
Finally, this overview illustrates Hughes' discussion of Lockean
philosophy of real property and how the "Enough and as Good"
principles apply to intellectual property.

A. Adding to the Dialogue: Considerthe Silent Majority
Hughes' impetus for writing this article was to add commentary
to an ongoing academic dialogue regarding the appropriate level of
Mitchell's southern epic Gone With the Wind from the viewpoint of Scarlett's
biracial, half-sister Cynara, a slave).
10. This overview does not represent a detailed, systematic analysis of
Hughes' entire work; rather, it focuses on global themes.
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control granted to intellectual property owners in the United
States.'
Responding to several Deconstructionists, Hughes
suggests that, to find the correct balance, the interests of all
affected parties must be considered, including those of the
audience-or recipients of the owners' messages. 2 Hughes
introduces the concept that a majority of listeners prefers the
meanings of cultural objects to remain steady and does not want
the responsibility to recode messages.' 3 To support his theory,
Hughes considers several aspects of audience interests.
1. PersonhoodInterests
Hughes cites how some intellectual property laws serve as
protection of a creator's "personality
interest[s]"
or
"personhood."'" Hughes recognizes that authors often consider
their creations to be an extension of themselves, a reflection of
their person and, therefore, deserving of intellectual property
protection.' 5 Hughes connects this "personality theory" to the
legal structures of moral rights'6 for authors and right of publicity
11. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 924-27.
12. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 924-27.
13. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 957.
14. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 923-24. Many authors have explored the
concept of personhood interests; see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982); Steven Cherensky, Agreements,
Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REv. 595, 646, 646-53 (1993)
(suggesting that authors have a "personality stake in their inventions").
15. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 924.
16. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). The rights afforded
by VARA are waivable, yet not transferable. The relevant sections provide:
§ 106A. Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity
(a) Rights of attribution and integrity. Subject to section 107
and independent of the exclusive rights provided in section
106, the author of a work of visual art (1) shall have the right
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the
use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art
which he or she did not create; (2) shall have the right to
prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of
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protection for celebrities, 7 which grant creators and authors some
degree of control over the flow and manipulation of their works. 8
visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or
her honor or reputation; and (3) subject to the limitations set
forth in section 113(d), shall have the right (A) to prevent any
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that
work is a violation of that fight.
(b) Scope and exercise of rights. Only the author of a work of
visual art has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that
work, whether or not the author is the copyright owner. The
authors of a joint work of visual art are co-owners of the rights
conferred by subsection (a) in that work.
Id.
17. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 924.
18. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA KWALL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT

LAW (1996) (laying out an in-depth discussion of the history, development, and
benefits of a moral rights system). See also Roberta Kwall, Symposium:
Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century: Article Preserving
Personality and Reputational Interest of Constructed Personas through Moral
Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 151
(2001) (advocating the protection of the personal interests of authors under
federal copyright law's moral-rights doctrine).
See also NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8D.01 Moral Rights (Matthew Bender and Co. ed., 2002).
Nimmer outlines succinctly in his treatise the basics of moral rights and the
doctrine's French origins:
§ 8D.01 Introduction
A-Types of Moral Rights
Certain countries of the world have long recognized rights
personal to authors, and as such viable separate and apart from
the economic aspect of copyright. Their separate viability is
such that a full transfer of copyright may suffice for all
economic purposes, but may exert no impact on the assertion

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

5

DePaul Journal
& Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14,
Iss. 2 [2016],171
Art. 2
DEPAULJ.ART.&ENT.LAW
[Vol.XIV:
176 of Art, Technology

of these claims.
In France, home country to the doctrine, these rights are
known as le droit moral, or moral rights. "The adjective
'moral' has no precise English equivalent, although 'spiritual',
'non-economic' and 'personal' convey something of the
intended meaning."
It is beyond the scope of this treatise to treat moral rights
under the laws of their European homelands. Some may
overlap others, and perhaps no country affords every
conceivable species of moral right. In brief, the following
summary encompasses the various rights that can be grouped
together under this rubric. First, there are numerous variations
on the attribution right (droit au respect du nom; also, droit a
la paternite):
- the right to be known as the author of his work;
- the right to prevent others from falsely attributing to him the
authorship of a work that he has not in fact written;
- the right to prevent others from being named as the author of
his work;
- the right to publish a work anonymously or pseudonymously,
as well as the right to change his mind at a later date and claim
authorship under his own name;
- the right to prevent others from using the work or the
author's name in such a way as to reflect adversely on his
professional standing.
In addition, there are several distinct categories that comprise
the classic droit moral:
- the right to prevent others from making deforming changes
in his work (droit au respect de l'oeuvre);
- the right to publish a work, or to withhold it from
dissemination (droitde divulgation); and
- the right to withdraw a published work from distribution if it
no longer represents the views of the author (droit de retrait;
also, droit de repentir).
Under French law, the moral right is conceived as perpetual,
inalienable, and imprescriptible. In theory, therefore, even
today in France, an outrageous stage or film version of Le
Medecin Malgre Lui could be challenged and subjected to the
full range of sanctions for violation of the moral right.
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After establishing the base of personhood interests from which
springs moral rights and right of publicity protections, Hughes
identifies an academic movement that advocates lesser intellectual
property protections to make way for greater dissemination of
ideas, the Deconstructionist critique of intellectual property.
2. DeconstructionistTheory
To set up his Article, Hughes identifies several
Deconstructionist academics of the 1990s, systematically
criticizing their cases for reduced intellectual property rights.' 9
Hughes summarizes the core of the Deconstructionist argument:
"[O]wners' rights to control their intellectual property are really
rights about who controls social meaning;"2 therefore society must
scrutinize closely who garners such power. He further clarifies the
Deconstructionist perspective:
[C]hanges in meaning are welcome and property
rights should be limited to give non-owners greater
breadth to shape their own messages and, thereby,
increase the personhood benefits that intellectual
creations bring to those non-owners. In other
words, true solicitude for personal development
calls for weakening of the barriers created by
intellectual property.21
This increased freedom to recode, according to Deconstructionists,

Moreover, even if Moliere's line has long since expired in the
three centuries since that play was penned, the French state
might still be able to protect the integrity right under a parens
patriae (emphasis in original) theory.

Id.
19. See Hughes, supra note 1, at n.7. Throughout the article, Hughes
critiques theories proposed by Keith Aoki, Rosemary J. Coombe, and Michael
Madow, as well as other theorists.
20. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 924.
21. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 924.
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will shift exclusive control of intellectual property away from
owners, thawing the flow of cultural messages to allow for a freer
exchange of ideas and more space for "talking back."2 Generally,
Deconstructionists contend that First Amendment freedoms should
trump intellectual property restrictions, allowing secondary users
to stamp their new, unique meaning on another's intellectual
property before passing it along.23
i. DeconstructionistsArgue that Recoding Restrictions
Hinder MarginalizedGroups
A central tenet of Deconstructionist critique is the negative
effect of strict intellectual property laws on marginalized groups,
such as homosexuals, Native Americans, adolescents, and
feminists.2 4 Deconstructionists argue that limiting the freedom of
marginalized groups to recode others' intellectual property stifles
valuable expression that may "challenge or subvert the 'preferred

22. Hughes uses the works of Rosemary Coombe and Michael Madow to lay
the foundation of the Deconstructionist movement; he cites these authors' strong
personhood arguments against the right of publicity. Hughes states: "Madow's
thesis is that the right of publicity has become a de facto control mechanism for
meaning in popular culture." See Hughes, supra note 1, at 929. Hughes also
cites Coombe's assessment of the problems prompted by strict intellectual
property controls, "Intellectual Property laws stifle dialogic practices preventing us from using the most powerful, prevalent, and accessible forms to
express identity, community and difference." See Hughes, supra note 1, at 931
(quoting Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Propertyand Subjects of to Politics:
Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853,
1855 (1991).
23. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 931-32. For an in-depth exploration of
Deconstructionist arguments against restrictive intellectual property laws, see
Keith Aoki, (Intellectual)Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1337 (1996); Keith Aoki,
Adrift in -the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding Rights, " 68 CHIKENT L. REV. 805 (1993); and Coombe, supra note 22, at 1855 (1991).
24. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 931. Deconstructionists do not focus solely
on the group effects of intellectual property laws. Individuals also suffer under
intellectual property restraints, according to low-protectionists.
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meaning."' 25 Specifically, intellectual property laws may bar
marginalized groups from employing a famous persona as an
effective medium to convey a valuable, minority viewpoint.26 One
Deconstructionist commentator supports this type of recoding by
marginalized groups, which subverts a carefully constructed
persona. A celebrity's right of publicity could become "power to
deny others the use of her persona in the construction and
communication of alternative or oppositional identities and social
relations; power, ultimately, to limit the expressive and
communicative opportunities of the rest of us."27
ii. Corporationsv. Individual Creators:
Who Benefits from IntellectualProperty Laws?

In his Article, Hughes challenges the Deconstructionist notion
that corporations, not individuals, are the primary benefactors of
intellectual property laws.
According to Deconstructionists,
intellectual property regimes work to increase corporate control
over the flow of information through the creation of "media
giants" that transmit homogenous, whitewashed messages.28 This
practice, some Deconstructionists warn, could lead to a vast,
25. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 931.
26. Hughes introduces real-life examples of two famous movie stars, John
Wayne and Clark Gable, who underwent makeovers on greeting cards with gay
themes, such as John Wayne sporting bright pink lipstick. According to
Hughes, the heirs to John Wayne's and Clark Gable's estates objected to the
implications of homosexuality. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 931.
27. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 931 (citing Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of the Public Image: Popular Culture and PublicityRights, 81 CAL.
L. REv. 125, 145-46 ((1993)). Madow's Deconstructionist work has become a
seminal article in the academic debate over the relevance of intellectual property
protection.
28. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 932. Hughes is replying to Keith Aoki's
assertions that communication company mergers of the 1990s, in tandem with
Internet and digital media advances create "giant companies premised on
copyright control of intellectual property from conception to delivery via media
links to consumers, and presents us with the distinct prospect of creation of
private domain." (internal quotations omitted) citing Property and Sovereignty,
supra note 23, at 1347.
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corporate-controlled private domain.29 Hughes counters this belief,
noting that the "conception phase of intellectual productions," such
as song or script writing, is geared towards independent creators."
Drawing on his own experience with the entertainment trade, he
argues that, within the music industry, artists still "form bands,
write their own material, play gigs in small venues, struggle to
survive, make demo tracks, and hope to 'get signed."' 31 In the
motion picture world, Hughes says, people continue to turn out
original scripts.32
Hughes articulates the commonly understood fear that creators
may lose their intellectual property to a corporate thief who will
"steal" their ideas upon submission of a proposal, a script, or a
song.33 Hughes places this scenario in an intellectual property
context: "They are concerned that the company will reject their
expression, but embrace the underlying unprotected ideas."34
Hughes uses this fear as a springboard for his response to
Deconstructionists in which he asserts that individuals still need
the shield of intellectual property laws: "It is difficult to believe
that these people-the ones who are truly at the conception of
intellectual works-would benefit by weakening the limited
protections they now have." " Intellectual property laws, Hughes
29. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 932
30. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 932-33.
31. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 933.
32. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 933.
33. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 934.
34. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 934.
35. Hughes asserts that the realities of lawsuits that involve recoding issues
provide evidence for his contention that individuals, not companies, receive a
greater benefit from strong intellectual property protections. Hughes supports
his argument with a specific, highly-visible case example: controversy
surrounding the motion picture The Devil's Advocate. In 1997, the artist
Frederick Hart sued Warner Brothers for the unauthorized recoding of Hart's
work in the motion picture, The Devil's Advocate. Hart's sculpture, Ex Nihilo,
welcomes visitors to the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. In The Devil's
Advocate, Satan, a New York attorney, had a sculpture very similar to Ex Nihilo
decorating his office wall. At the movie's climax, the sculpture comes to life
dramatically. Eventually, Warner Brothers was forced to settle with the sculptor
to go forward with video distribution of the film. See id.; see supra note 1, at
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asserts, are vital to protect individual and small group creators in
the entertainment industry against aggressive, avaricious business
practices designed to facilitate corporate agendas.36 Therefore,
according to Hughes, intellectual property laws may benefit
individuals more than they benefit corporations.
3. Non-Owners' Social Utility Interests in Stable Cultural Objects
In "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests, Hughes notes that courts have explored the stability
interests of intellectual property owners at length; Hughes
challenges his readers to take the next step by considering the
audience's interest in stability of cultural objects.37 Claiming that
Deconstructionists ignore this relevant side of the issue, Hughes
supports his central thesis that intellectual property and recoding
discourse overlook audience interests in stable meanings of
cultural objects. He frames the tension:
The problem is that putting the focus on the need of
some non-owners to recode the cultural object deemphasizes how much all non-owners rely on the
934. See also Hart v. WarnerBros., Civ. No. 97-1956-A (E.D. Va. 1998); For a

discussion of the case's impact on Hart from a Christian viewpoint, see Karen L.
Mulder, He Made Stone Talk. Sculptor FrederickHart's Painful Vindication,
CHRISTIANITY
TODAY
(Mar.
6
2000),
at

http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2000/003/7.80.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2004).

36. Hughes provides other examples of lawsuits where individuals used
intellectual property laws as tools to fight corporate abuse. Id. For examples of
musicians who resisted corporate attempts to pass off sound-alikes in
commercials, see Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992)
(awarding recording artist Tom Waits a multi-million dollar settlement because
Frito-Lay employed an unauthorized sound-alike in commercials); Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding liable defendant-car

manufacturer for employing a voice sound-alike to misappropriate a celebrity'9
voice).
37. In this vein, Hughes argues that copyright laws serve as protector of
language, stepping in to preserve meaning where the human memory would
otherwise fail. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 941.
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same cultural object having a stable, commonly
understood set of meanings. This need for stability
exists both for the non-owners who want to recode
and for a vast, (literally) silent majority who derive
utility from the object's stable meanings.38
Hughes argues that there are significant audience benefits to a
cultural object maintaining stable meaning, including both
informational and non-informational social utility.39
i. Social Utility Derivedfrom Stable Meanings
Comporting with his central thesis that Deconstructionists
overlook audience interests when criticizing intellectual property
laws, Hughes raises the concept of "true listeners," people who
will listen passively with no desire to recode a message.4" Hughes
claims that listeners have a high stake in meaning stability because
they derive information from conveyed intellectual property;
consumers rely on a trademark's message to provide a capsule of
information about the quality and consistency of a product or that
consumers trust valid celebrity product endorsements.4 Hughes
38. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 941.
39. As a primary point, Hughes implies that greater recoding freedom will
weaken the evolution of cultural messages. The ability of a secondary user to
recode depends on the image first having obtained "underlying stability."
Without stability, recoding of a particular object would be impossible and
secondary users would have no raw material with which to work. To support
his argument, Hughes lists five case examples, both real and hypothetical
situations, of how the lack of a stable meaning would disserve society. He cites
the possibility of Aryan extremists seizing on Madonna's "platinum" image to
peddle their message of hate, which disallowed a college girl the opportunity of
liberating self-expression via t-shirt because Madonna's meaning had lost
stability. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 941-47.
40. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 952.
41. In this discussion, Hughes specifically attacks Madow's debatable
premise that right of publicity laws do not focus on limiting public deception.
Hughes calls Madow's point that the right of publicity does little to shield
consumers' informational interests "empirically unproved." See Hughes, supra
note 1, at 952.
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believes, despite Deconstructionist counterclaims, that consumers
likely do rely on endorsements to make purchasing decisions;
therefore, recoding freedom that encourages unauthorized
manipulation of these messages could injure consumers.42
According to Hughes, listeners also derive a type of emotional,
non-informational social utility from the stability of cultural
meanings. To provide evidence for his contention, Hughes
attempts to peer into passive listeners' consumer desires. Hughes
claims that, beyond informational utility, passive listeners derive
utility by identifying and communicating with cultural objects.43
Listeners may privately recode a meaning of a cultural object; yet
they refrain from any public recoding."
To illustrate, Hughes notes that several people seek stability in
commonly known cultural objects, such as designer labels or
luxury cars, in an effort to fit in with their peers.45 Most people
seize on a stable cultural object and, instead of attempting to
redefine it, hope that the image will "redefine them."46 Hughes
pushes this further, claiming that the "average American" rejects
the responsibility of recoding messages and is comfortable instead
with passively consuming the information he or she receives.
Therefore, Hughes argues that we should consider the personality
needs of passive non-users at least as much as the concerns of
active secondary users.48
42. At the very least, Hughes argues it is not fact that consumers simply
disregard endorsements as fluff because, in our current society, celebrities will
readily lend their image to any product (for the right price). See Hughes, supra
note 1, at 953-55.
43. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 955.

44. To illustrate his point that consumers identify with certain cultural
objects, Hughes discusses an early 1970's poster of Farrah Fawcett-Majors that
was displayed ubiquitously in "workshops, locker rooms, [and] men's dorm
rooms" across the country. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 955.
45. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 956.
46. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 957.

47. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 957. Hughes points to the case of the
unpopularity of hypertext novels as a classic deconstructionist example of
recoding. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 957.
48. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 957-59.
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Due to the popular demand for cultural stability in certain
objects or symbols, Hughes argues that, while some recoding may
increase utility for secondary users, it can also rob others of the
social utility they find in the object's original meaning.49 Hughes
claims that several non-owners are unhappy with certain
recodings; he uses the example of American Airlines adopting
George Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue as theme music in the
1990s.5 ° Hughes believes that a disutility accompanied any cultural
gains made through this particular recoding:
There were gains in utility: a beautiful tune more
often on the airwaves and perhaps some special
pride instilled in United's management, employees,
and frequent flyers. But was there a decrease in
overall utility as a classic, soaring melody that
symbolized America's coming of age was recoded
to mean a 777 banking toward O'Hare? Does
everyone gain or lose when a Cole Porter classic is
recoded by a toilet bowl cleaner to be I've Got You
Under My Rim?5
Hughes proposes the idea that certain cultural messages, if open to
rampant recoding, could easily lose their ability to attract listeners
through overexposure."

49. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 959.
50. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 959.
51. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 959.
52. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 959. Conceding that some cultural objects
are impervious to dilution of meaning (i.e. the Statue of Liberty or the Eiffel

Tower), Hughes contends that some recodings may overpower the original
message. As examples of recoded messages that have overpowered the original,
Hughes notes Saturday Night Live's I Love Sodom parody of the I Love New
York song. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 961.
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ii. Value of Diversity-GreaterRecoding Freedom
Could Stifle Diverse Messages
Deconstructionists advocate thinner intellectual property
protections to allow for a richer marketplace of ideas. Hughes
recognizes the importance of diverse discourse; however, he
chooses to measure the pool of ideas in terms of quality as well as
quantity. 3
Hughes proposes the idea that greater recoding
freedom could also allow for the muffling of valuable, extreme
messages that contribute to a heterogeneous marketplace of ideas. 4
To support his argument, he recounts a case in which an offbeat
British comedy troupe successfully enjoined ABC from
broadcasting a watered down version of the amusingly crude
Monty Python 's Flying Circus.5 Corporate ABC wished to recode
53. See Hughes, supra note 1, at at 964.
54. Hughes notes that too much recoding
"government takings" of certain cultural objects:

freedom could result

in

Fortunately, we do not live in a society where we can point to
many examples of the government taking private people's
expressions and trying to recode those expressions, but a glint
of what would be at stake is visible in cases that consider
whether the government has "taken" a copyrighted work. It is
not difficult to imagine circumstances in which national
leaders might want to dull certain cultural objects by recoding
(Doonesbury) or a government might want to recode popular
images for its own purposes, whether they be Norman
Rockwell paintings or Madonna's image.
See Hughes, supra note 1, at 966.
55. Hughes uses the case of Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976),
to illustrate his point. In 1976, the authors of the popular, irreverent "Monty
Python's Flying Circus" television series sought copyright protection in the
New York courts when American Broadcasting Company (ABC) edited the
programs for re-broadcast in the United States. Id. at 14. ABC licensed three
90-minute Monty Python episodes from BBC in 1973 and planned to broadcast
them "back-to-back." To make room for commercials, ABC edited out
approximately 24 minutes of each 90-minute episode; ABC also omitted content
because the original programs contained "offensive or obscene matter." Id. at
18.
The Second Circuit barred the broadcast, granting the plaintiffs a
preliminary injunction on the theory that the defendant's severe edits were a
mutilation of plaintiffs' copyrighted work that constituted copyright
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the series to its more vanilla comedic taste, an act the individual
authors successfully opposed using current intellectual property
protections.
4. Recoding within Current and Potential Intellectual Property
Regimes
After establishing that current IP laws can be used effectively to
discourage different types of recoding, Hughes notes that this same
set of laws simultaneously allows for adequate recoding freedom.
This section now explores Hughes' implication that US property
regimes work in harmony to provide both proponents of stability
and recoders with some coverage. Hughes also concedes that
weighing audience stability interests too heavily could unfairly
impede owners' rights.

infringement. See id. at 36. Plaintiffs also brought a Trademark Infringement
action under the Lanham Act. Id. at 27. The Court's rationale for restricting
ABC's right to recode deflects Deconstructionists arguments, reiterating the
importance of owner control:
The rationale for finding infringement when a licensee
exceeds time or media restrictions on his license-the need to
allow the proprietor of the underlying copyright to control the
method in which his work is presented to the public-applies
equally to the situation in which a licensee makes an
unauthorized use of the underlying work by publishing it in a
truncated version. Whether intended to allow greater
economic exploitation of the work, as in the media and time
cases, or to ensure that the copyright proprietor retains a veto
power over revisions desired for the derivative work, the
ability of the copyright holder to control his work remains
paramount in our copyright law. We find, therefore, that
unauthorized editing of the underlying work, if proven, would
constitute an infringement of the copyright in that work
similar to any other use of a work that exceeded the license
granted by the proprietor of the copyright.
Id. at21.
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i. Sufficient Freedoms to Borrow Exist under
Current Intellectual PropertyLaws
Not all celebrities are unique. As one Deconstructionist theorist
explains, several pop culture stars borrow heavily from existing
artists and, therefore, strict intellectual property laws should not
bar later artists from following a similar path to inspiration. 6
Hughes argues that this logic is faulty as several artists who
"borrow" from past celebrities have not been limited by existing
intellectual property constraints: "Madonna, Prince, and Elvis
Costello have drawn heavily from Marilyn Monroe, Jimi Hendrix,
and Buddy Holly, respectively-heavily, successfully, and
apparently without debilitating legal obstacles."57
Hughes charges Deconstructionists with exaggerating the degree
to which intellectual property laws freeze the process of changes to
meaning. He claims that U.S. law supports the type of borrowing
in which Madonna, Prince, and Elvis Costello engage." In this

era, meanings change at a "wonderfully dizzying pace" and a set
of legal doctrines work to protect these types of recoding, Hughes
states.6"

As evidence of a sufficiently accessible public domain, Hughes
cites the existence of the scenes a faire doctrine,6" parody options,
56. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 947 (commenting on Rosemary J. Coombe,
Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and
UnauthorizedGenders, 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 365, 371 (1992)).
57. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 947.
58. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 947.
59. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 947.
60. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 948.
61. Copyright protects expression, not ideas.
This idea/expression
dichotomy is central to the understanding of copyright law. It ensures that only
the author's concrete contributions will be protected. The raw pool of material
from which to draw will not be depleted. "Scenes a faire" are standard themes
found in theatrical works and literature and belong to this pool of ideas free for
all to use. Basic examples of "scenes a faire" include unrequited love, the battle
between good and evil, and a struggle to find one's real identity. More specific
plot lines also qualify as "scenes a faire." Examples include friendly aliens (the
film "ET"), the theft of nuclear weapons from a "dilapidated Russian arsenal,"
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general fair use, and the basic "thinness of copyright."6 2 He opines
that artists have great freedom to pull inspiration from their
surroundings in order to create original works. Hughes goes into
depth on the value of scenes afaire:
Although not the most rigorously formulated
doctrine, the scenes a faire principle permits authors
to use scenes, incidents, or elements in their story
that "flow naturally from a basic plot premise" even
though those elements may come close to elements
in existing, copyrighted works ....In some sense,
the scenes a faire doctrine is a shadow of the more
fundamental proposition that there is no copyright
in facts: scenes a faire are akin to abstract "facts"
about particular times and places.63
Thus, Hughes says, creators are free to employ common themes
without fear of infringement actions.
Hughes also calls his readers' attention to room for recoding
found within right of publicity statutes. California, according to
Hughes, has a highly evolved system of publicity protections due
to the state's active entertainment industry.' California's law
carves out specific exceptions that allow for free use of anyone's
likeness or voice for "news, public affairs,... or any political
campaign."65 Hughes concludes that the present set of intellectual
property laws "stabilizes meaning to some degree but does not
fence off as much as some think."66
Even though Hughes advocates considering audience interests in
stability when debating appropriate levels of intellectual property
the tale of a woman rejecting a man's dominance, or the stock character of a
sleazy music producer. COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE, § 2:2.2
(Practicing Law Institute ed., 2001).
62. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 949.
63. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 949 (internal citations omitted).
64. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 951.
65. See CAL. Clv. CODE 3344(d) (West 1997).
66. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 951.
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protections, he does not advocate shifting too much control from
owners' hands into the hands of audiences. This section next
outlines Hughes' explanation of how a legal structure built on
audience reliance interests in stability would clash with some U.S.
legal fundamentals.
ii. Listeners v. Owners: Caution RegardingLaws
Cateringto Audience Reliance Interests
Generally, Hughes encourages weighing non-owners' interests
in maintaining stable meaning against secondary users' desires to
recode.67 In "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked
Audience Interests, Hughes presents another tension-when
owners of cultural objects wish to recode but face resistance from
an audience dedicated to the object's original, stable meaning. In
his in-depth exploration of listener interests in cultural stability,
Hughes introduces several key examples:
People who read a particular novel may not want to
see it turned into a movie; fans of a book, movie, or
play may oppose the creation of a sequel. How
many devotees of Gone with the Wind were
opposed to the 1990s sequel Scarlett? How many
fans of the book Dune were opposed to the movie
version? How many comic book readers of old have
been saddened as the look and feel of Batman or
Spiderman have changed over the years? It is
probably accurate to say that these situations in
which the owner desires to recode tend to occur
when there is an effort to reap greater commercial
advantage from an existing cultural object ...As

one commentator noted, "Fans also see themselves
as guardians of the texts they love, purer than the
owners in some ways because they seek no profit."68
67. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 988.
68. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 988-99 (internal citations and quotations
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Despite Hughes' assertions that audience interests are key to the
debate between high-protectionists and Deconstructionists, he
recognizes that these audience reliance interests may not comport
with intellectual property laws.69
Audiences have a reliance interest in a variety of cultural objects
protected by trademark or copyright laws. Hughes uses the case of
Adams v. Dream Day Publishing, Inc.7" to illustrate a situation
where this audience interests in stability may serve to "fix" the
meaning of a cultural object. The Adams court estopped a
publisher from issuing posters under the name Ansel Adams
because the publisher only photocopied Adams prints; it did not
adhere to Adams' signature method of printing.71 The judge in the
case went a step further, setting out the requirements for a print to
be labeled a true Ansel Adams." Hughes argues that the judge's
decision can be viewed as an attempt to "fix the meaning of an
'Ansel Adams' photograph as roughly what it meant at the time
omitted). It is convenient to this Article Review that Hughes himself introduced
the issue of Gone With the Wind fans' interests in stabilizing the novel's original
meaning conveyed by Margaret Mitchell. Hughes suggests that this brand of
interests should be considered more seriously in the discourse between high
protectionists and deconstructionists. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 988-99.
Later, in Part III, this Review will challenge some of Hughes' contentions using
the case of a controversial 2001 recoding of Gone With the Wind as a vehicle for
analysis.
69. Famous people, Hughes analogizes, are like "public resources;" nonowners draw on those stable public images to extract a certain feeling and to
assert their own self-expression. When a famous person's true, less-than-perfect
selves emerge, audiences revolt. As an example, Hughes tells the story of Mary
Pickford, an actress famous for playing a young girl even after age 30.
Audiences were indignant when the actress chose to shear her trademark curls.
"Once the real figure beneath the image started to surface, when Chaplin's
outspokenness was deemed un-American, or Pickford went through a messy
divorce, the audience was scandalized at this threat to their perception of the
star." See Hughes, supra note 1, at 988-99.
70. No. C-89-0873-WDK (C.D. Cal. 1989) (granting plaintiffs a preliminary
injunction against defendant publisher).
71. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 990-91.
72. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 990-91.
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Adams ended his career."73 This decision protects Ansel Adams
purists yet, Hughes asserts, the decision places the interests of nonowners above the interests of owners in recoding the cultural
object.74
Hughes ponders what would happen if a steady trend of
upholding non-owners' interest in stability over owners' desires to
recode were to emerge.75 If owners choose to alter the goods they
sell under a certain brand, such as selling no-frills, budget
automobiles under the upscale ACURA trademark, could they face
charges as if they were infringers for causing consumer
confusion?76 While arguing for consideration of audience interests
in stability, Hughes warns against laws that grant non-owner
interests too much control. As Hughes notes, non-owners have
built in protections-if they do not like the recoded image, they do
77
not have to consume it.
In his Article, Hughes does not fixate solely on the future state
of U.S. intellectual property protections. He also looks to the past,
applying eighteenth century philosophy of real property to the
dialogue between high-protectionists and Deconstructionists.
5. Applying Real Property Philosophy to Intellectual Property:
Enough and As Good
Another major theme of "Recoding" Intellectual Property and
Overlooked Audience Interests considers the "cumulative effect of
property rights over cultural objects" and its impact on
expression." Overall, Hughes argues that, often, people have other
73. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 990.
74. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 990.
75. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 991.
76. Hughes notes "There is no question that people in America use cars for
self-expression. Could people who bought the new, inferior cars have any claim
based on their reliance on the established meaning of 'Acura'?" Hughes goes
on to say that, in a legal system that over-values audience interests, owners of
the traditional Acura may have a dilution claim against the intellectual property
owners. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 991.
77. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 1008.
78. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 966.
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options for creation and need not recode another's intellectual
property, and that there are not enough secondary users deprived
of material by intellectual property laws to justify a change in the
system.7 9 He contends that consumers benefit when artists are
more industrious, as opposed to simply recoding another's efforts,
when rooting for creative inspiration.
i. Locke 's Theory of "'EnoughandAs Good" Explained
Hughes borrows from philosopher John Locke's theory of
private property to examine justifications for granting owners
exclusive rights to their intellectual property. Hughes contends
that Deconstructionist arguments require a reexamination of
Lockean notions. Locke was a proponent of communal property
ownership."0 Therefore, the notion of excluding others from
property forces two of Locke's central philosophies to bend in
order to work together: (1) that each individual "plots a course for
his own preservations," and (2) that everyone is "under a natural
obligation to ensure that this [course] conduces to the preservation
of all."'" Locke justifies the notion of appropriating property for
exclusive use if, even though property rights are communal in a
Lockean world, "enough and as good" land remains available for
propertization by others.8 2 This compromise allows Locke's two
79. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 969-72. To provide evidence for his
theories, Hughes turns to the courts. Hughes supports a case decision in which a
civic group against gay bashing was refised access to the name "Pink Panther
Control."
On. the other hand, Hughes questioned the Supreme Court's
controversial award of control to the Olympic Committee over term "Olympic,"
a word that has been part of world vocabulary for centuries. Hughes notes that
"Olympic" has a specific meaning with no sufficient substitute; this produces a
clear enough and as good problem. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 969-72. Yet,
Hughes asserts that the majority of creators will find a way to work around the
problem: The question is whether there are enough secondary users to justify
shaping the legal system to respond to their needs?" See Hughes, supra note 1,
at 987.
80. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 967.
81. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 968-69.
82. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 967.
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central philosophies to coexist.
Locke states that, when
surrounded by vast resources, people can fence off the fruits of
their labor without interfering with others' rights to do the same.83
Hughes believes that this enough and as good theory applies to
the Deconstructionist critique of intellectual property:
Cast in Locke's light, the deconstructionist
argument could say that once all the controls over
images now inherent in copyright, trademark, and
the right of publicity are recognized, there will not
be enough and as good cultural "material" to be
used by others (propertized or not) for their own
self-expression.84
Hughes contests this Deconstructionist argument that intellectual
property laws result in a depletion of resources for others.85 In
83. Hughes explains Lockean justifications in more detail:
The enough and as good condition harmonizes some
potentially conflicting propositions in Locke's philosophy.
First, each person both "plots a course for his own
preservation" and "is under a natural obligation to ensure that
this conduces to the preservation of all." The condition
ensures that actions taken for self-preservation, in other
words, seizing natural resources, do not disturb the prospects
of others for self-preservation. Locke also posits that things in
nature belong to all in common, but if the common is owned
by everyone, then universal consent would be needed to
justify an act of privatization; Locke overcomes this issue by
understanding the community right in the commons as a right
of opportunity, so that consent is not needed to take property
from the commons as long as enough opportunities remain for
others.
See Hughes, supra note 1, at 967.
84. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 968.
85. To provide evidence for his theories, Hughes turns to the courts. Hughes
supports a case decision in which a civic group against gay bashing was refused
access to the name "Pink Panther Control." On the other hand, Hughes
questioned the Supreme Court's controversial award of control to the Olympic
Committee over term "Olympic," a word that has been part of world vocabulary
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fact, Hughes argues that a narrower public domain from which to
"borrow" has clear benefits to consumers.
ii. How CulturalConsumersBenefit from
IntellectualPropertyRestraints on Artists
In his exploration of Lockean philosophy, Hughes presents an
interesting notion about how we, as consumers, have benefited
from constraints imposed on artists by intellectual property laws.
He claims that, in the spirit of enough and as good, perhaps artists
such as Madonna and Buddy Holly were pushed to go beyond their
comfort zones for inspiration:
Perhaps Prince started out his career really only
wanting to be a Jimi Hendrix clone; perhaps for a
time Madonna wanted only to be a Marilyn Monroe
imitator; if intellectual property laws actually
pushed these people away from existing cultural
objects, are we not pleased, both for them and for
us?86
Hughes seems to say that conceivably, with greater recoding
freedom, performers would be content with simply performing
others' work as opposed to going to the trouble of original
creation. Hughes' reasoning also applies to parodies and satire.
iii. Enough andAs Good in Parody Situations
In this section, Hughes views the instance of parody through a
Deconstructionist enough and as good lens. Hughes claims that, in
fact, parody case law limits parodies that are more diffuse,87 noting
for centuries. Hughes notes that "Olympic" has a specific meaning with no
sufficient substitute; this produces a clear enough and as good problem. See
Hughes, supra note 1, at 969-72.
86. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 981.
87. Hughes' discusses artist Jeff Koons' parodies of society at large using the
copyrighted image of Odie, the dog character from the Garfield cartoon. Courts
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that current parody law requires artists to expressly and directly
reply to certain works or situations (as opposed to parodying
society in general by using some protected works as tools to
convey the message).8 Hughes claims that, while some artists will
indeed be handicapped by these recoding restrictions, several other
enterprising artists will find a successful way to work around the
problem. 9 In line with his central tenet that the majority of
listeners craves stability, Hughes questions whether intellectual
property laws should bend to make things easier for only a small
group of secondary users.9
6. Overview Conclusion
Hughes concludes his Article with a call to consider in the
scholarly dialogue regarding justifications for intellectual property
laws a broader spectrum of interests, specifically, audience

found this to be an unacceptable parody because it was not a direct reply to a
situation or a work. Instead, the artist was using protected images for his own
communicative message, but admitted to the courts that he was not parodying
the images. Koons was using copyrighted images 'to symbolize the cynical and
empty nature of society' and 'as a satire or parody of society at large which
showed that mass production of commodities and images had led to a
deterioration of the quality of society.' See Hughes, supra note 1, at 938-39.
88. Hughes provides his definition of parody:
A parody is a reply which acknowledges both the original
coding of the subject work and the original work's social
place; as the district court in Elsmere wrote, "Parody is an
acknowledgment of the importance of things parodied." For
Saturday Night Live's I Love Sodom to be an effective parody
of the song I Love New York, the former has to do more than
conjure up the latter: the parody song is funny only as much
as it reminds you that the original song promotes New York
City with a Prozac-upbeat, unrealistic image of the Big Apple.
See Hughes, supra note 1, at 985 (internal citations omitted).
89. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 987.
90. In Hughes' words: "The question is whether there are enough secondary
users so deprived to justify shaping the legal system to respond to their needs."
See Hughes, supra note 1, at 987.
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interests in cultural stability.9' This Article Review will now move
into an analysis of Hughes' points, focusing in Part III on his
underlying critique of greater recoding freedoms; this Review
argues that, while Hughes has presented valid themes and
proposals, he has overlooked some values inherent in recoding.

III. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes Hughes' global themes, either supporting his
contentions or revealing flaws in his reasoning or examples.
Generally, this Article Review concludes that Hughes introduces
novel, valuable issues regarding overlooked audience interests to
the
ongoing
debate. between
high-protectionists
and
Deconstructionists. On the other hand, "Recoding" Intellectual
Property and Overlooked Audience Interests itself overlooks the
value of recoding as a powerful tool to achieve cultural revolution.
This Part is broken down into two sections. The first section offers
support for some of Hughes' contentions and the second criticizes
some of Hughes anti-deconstructionist assertions.
A.

Supportfor Hughes

Hughes' Article has been a valuable contribution to the debate
over the proper levels of intellectual property protection in U.S.
law. He presents valid arguments for increased intellectual
property protections, including the listener's interests in stability,
the social utility value of stable cultural objects, and interests in
preserving diversity of messages.
1. Adding to the Dialogue-ConsiderRecipients as Listeners as
well as Secondary Users
Hughes' central thesis that Deconstructionists must consider the
"silent majority" of audience members as well as the minority that
91. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 1010.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/2

26

LaVoi: The ValueTHE
of Recoding
Within
A Review of Justin Hughes' "
VALUE
OFReason:
RECODING
2004]

wishes to recode is sound. He adds another strand to the debate
concerning appropriate levels of intellectual property laws that had
been previously overlooked (as the title of his work suggests).
Since the publication of Hughes' work, other authors have
continued his exploration of the interests of a passive audience. 92
One commentator on the role of consumer in intellectual property
laws advocates, as Hughes does, considering more seriously how
consumer interests drive litigation:
To be sure, the interests of consumers of
copyrighted works are represented throughout the
Copyright Act. After all, the overall purpose of the
Copyright Act is not to reward authors for the
authors' sake, but to reward authors to benefit
consumers and society more generally. Copyright
doctrines are thus shaped to keep this ultimate goal
in mind. Yet, despite this recognition of a general
consumer interest, rather little has been written
about the precise shape and scope of this interest. 93
Hughes' work has tipped other commentators to a valid line of
questioning-whether audience interests deserve analysis and
evaluation. As a result of Hughes thinking beyond the interests of
only owners and secondary users, the discussion of the best form
of intellectual protections now boasts another layer.
2. Hughes' Illustrates that Non-Owners Derive Social Utility in
Stable CulturalObjects94
Hughes' discussion of the ways in which non-owners derive
social utility from stability of meanings is persuasive and
insightful. In the realm of informational utility, he successfully
92. See generally Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer,

44 B.C. L. REv 397 (2003) (exploring the concept of the consumer in copyright
law).
93. Id. at 398-99.
94. See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
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counters a powerful Deconstructionist argument that consumers do
not rely on the validity of celebrity endorsement to make
purchasing decisions.95 Deconstructionists claim that consumers
do not believe that celebrities use the products they endorse;
therefore, deregulating intellectual property laws connected to
right of publicity and sponsorship would not injure the consumer.96
97
Hughes concedes that, perhaps, Deconstructionists are correct;
however, without evidence, there is no way to know for certain.
Further, Hughes argues that consumers would be extremely
vulnerable immediately following a deregulation of the use of
celebrity personas:
Assuming [this argument] is correct - that any
current
linkage
between
endorsement
and
information transfer is the result of the legal
background - that does not lessen the initial loss in
utility that consumers could suffer from denying
celebrities their right of publicity. Is it likely that
during the considerable amount of time in which
consumers
would
still
link
images with
endorsement (information), advertisers - mainly
large corporations - would be milking celebrity
images for all that they were worth? 98
Hughes' argument prevails because Deconstructionists lack solid
evidence showing consumers disregard celebrity sponsorships.9 9
95. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 952-54. Hughes was responding to Michael
Madow's position. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of the Public
Image: PopularCulture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 237 (1993).
96. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 952-54.
97. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 954.
98. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 954

99. For evidence that consumers do, in fact, rely on celebrity endorsements,
see Matt Schiering, Red Carpet Branding, BRANDWEEK 44, no. 33, p. 28-30

(Sep 15, 2003). Schiering notes:
From intimate testimonials in TV commercials to waving
freebies at the Oscars, marketers have masterminded myriad
ways for their products to reach us through our famous
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His prediction for corporate abuse in a world with no celebrity
image regulation outweighs the Deconstructionist dismissal of
consumer reliance on sponsorships.
Hughes also convincingly argues that non-owners derive
substantial non-informational utility from cultural objects.' 0 In his
analysis of the human connection to goods, Hughes asserts that
people rely on an object's stable meaning to "redefine them". '
Hughes does not reveal new truths; psychologists have long
supported the theory of consumers' emotional connection to
certain brands or cultural objects. Businesses rely on this common
knowledge of the consumer mind; advertisers invest billions of
dollars annually based on the assumption that consumers will
purchase a certain brand for its self-expression value." 2
Independent psychological articles support Hughes' theories.
After conducting a focus group regarding brands, one
psychological researcher summarized this nexus between the
consumer's notion of self and the cultural images: "Having a
regular relationship with a brand can be habit. It is reassuring to
buy known quality."'0 3 Also, as Hughes notes, consumers identify
citizens. And with good reason: Celebrities wield considerable
power to influence consumer purchases. According to a 1999
study by Illinois State University, approximately 20% of all
television advertising features a well-known individual from
the world of sports, TV, movies or music. Other recent
academic studies have concluded that customers are more
likely to choose goods and services endorsed by celebrities
than those that are not, and that the more familiar the
pitchman, the more likely consumers are to buy the product.
Id. at 28. See also Chung-kue and Daniella McDonald, An Examination on
Multiple Celebrity Endorsers in Advertising, JOURNAL OF PRODUCT & BRAND

MGMT. 11, no. 1 p. 19-29 (2002) (concluding that the got milk? campaign's use
of several celebrities at www.whymilk.com contributed to the campaign's
overall success).
100. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 955-63.
101. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 957.
102. See Paul Marsden, Brand Positioning:Meme's the Word, MARKETING
INTELLIGENCE & PLANNING Vol 20(6) 2002, 307-12 (exploring advertising

techniques to fix brand meanings in the minds of consumers).
103 See Kelly Scermach, What Consumers Wish Brand Managers Knew,
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with brands and use them for self-expression. One respondent said
about Coca Cola, 'We've grown up with it. Coke has always been
the family friend."" '
According to the researcher, pinnacle
brands-such as Rolex or Armani-serve as icons to consumers.10 5
One focus group respondent admitted that he would consider
himself more successful if he were able to afford those brands." 6
This psychological evidence supports Hughes theory of a nonowner reliance interest in brand stability for social utility purposes.
3. Value of Diversity-Hughes' Theory that Greater Recoding
Freedoms Could Stifle Diverse Messages"7
Throughout his Article, Hughes deftly plays the role of devil's
advocate, spinning possibilities that Deconstructionists have
overlooked.
For example, Hughes asserts that, if
Deconstructionists were to win the fight for greater recoding
freedom, the victory could backfire and actually result in the
suppression of extreme messages.' 8 To support this theory,
Hughes uses a prime example in which ABC attempted to muffle
Monty Python's unique British brand of humor during an
American rebroadcast of the Monty Python's Flying Circus
Series."19

Hughes also looks to European history to prove his point that
greater recoding freedom exposes all works, conservative and
extreme, to plundering. Hughes points to the French Revolution;
in Paris, copyright protection virtually disappeared in the name of

MARKETING NEWS

TM p.9-17 (Jun 9, 1997).

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 964-66.

108. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 964-66.
109. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 964-66.

brand of humor, see

the following

fan

For more on Monty Python's

sites:

Python Online,

at

http://pythonline.com/home.htmi (last visited Sep. 20, 2004); Monty Python's
Completely Useless Website, at http://www.intriguing.com/mp/ (last visited
Sept. 20, 2004).
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free speech-leaving all works vulnerable to copying."'
One
commentator noted that, in fact, a society with no copyright
restrictions produced "homogenous" works;... therefore diversity
suffered for greater recoding freedom.
This historical lesson contradicts Deconstructionist arguments
that greater recoding freedom would usher in diversity of ideas to
enrich the marketplace of ideas. One Deconstructionist argues for
expansion of Fair Use in the context of visual arts to promote such
diverse discourse:
In order to challenge traditional assumptions of
artistic individuation, the artist incorporates the
images of another into his own work in a conscious
attempt to produce a radical, communal discourse.
Thus, the act of appropriation gives meaning to the
expression embodied in the creative work; the mere
simulation of images would reduce, if not eliminate,
the impact of the expression. In order to protect
such politically motivated expression, the law
should
accommodate
the
appropriation
of
reproduced images when used for expressive
purposes. 12
The above argument is convincing and thought-provoking;
however, it is some-what one-sided when compared to Hughes'
arguments. Hughes acknowledges that intellectual property may
restrain some radical speech, yet he takes the next crucial step in

110. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 965 (citing Carla Hesse, Publishing and
CulturalPolitics in Revolutionary Paris, 1789-1810, at 3-4, 98, 125-27 (1991)).
After the government abolished copyright protections, twenty-one French
publishers and booksellers declared bankruptcy. See id. at 73-76, 98-99.
Copyright laws were restored in 1793. See id. at 120.
111. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 965, n.186 (citing Charles C. Mann, Who
Will Own Your Next Good Idea?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1998, at 57, 76).
112. Patricia Craig, NOTE: Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93
YALE L. J. 1565, 1579-80 (July, 1984) (arguing for greater recoding freedoms in
the visual arts).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

31

DePaul202
Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14,
Iss. 2 [2016],171
Art. 2
DEPAULJ.ART.&ENT.LAW
[Vol.XIV:

the thought process. Hughes cautions, through both current and
historical examples, that greater recoding freedom could subvert
the intentions of Deconstructionists and "muffle extreme
messages" through a homogenization process." 3
4. Recoding under Current and Potential Intellectual Property
Regimes"4
This section commends Hughes' ability to analyze both current
and potential laws in a creative, yet realistic manner. Hughes' indepth survey of current intellectual property laws successfully
trumps popular Deconstructionist claims that current intellectual
property regimes do not provide ample room to recode." 5
A leading Deconstructionist scholar, Rosemary Coombe,
evinces that celebrities are not truly unique: "[S]tars and their fame
are never manufactured from whole cloth-the successful image is
frequently a form of cultural bricolage that improvises with a
social history of symbolic forms.""' 6 She explains that celebrities
have always borrowed from existing or past celebrities when
constructing their images or developing their styles." 7 This
process should be allowed to continue, unfettered by restrictions
on recoding, Coombe argues." 8 She gives several examples,
including Madonna's use of Marilyn Monroe-esque elements, to
support her claim." 9
Hughes considers Coombe's strong, thoughtfully-presented
113. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 964.
114. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 947-52.
115. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 947-49.
116. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 365, 370 (1992).
117. See id. at 371.
118. Id.
119. Coombe notes: "Take the image of Madonna, an icon whose meaning
and value lie partially in its evocation and ironic reconfiguration of several
twentieth- century sex-goddesses and ice-queens (Marilyn Monroe obviously,
but also Jean Harlow, Greta Garbo, and Marlene Dietrich) that speaks with
multiple tongues to diverse audiences." Id.
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arguments, yet deflects them with common sense:
[M]any of the examples she gives have not been
circumscribed by existing laws: Madonna, Prince,
and Elvis Costello have drawn from Marilyn
Monroe, Jimi Hendrix, and Buddy Holly,
respectively - heavily, successfully, and apparently
without debilitating legal obstacles. But there is a
great difference between Elvis Costello and a
Buddy Holly impersonator. Few confuse Prince
with Jimi Hendrix, just as few confuse Picasso's
Las Meninas with the Velazquez painting that
inspired it. 2 '
Hughes' commentary supports his theory that Deconstructionists
"hyperbolize" the extent to which current intellectual property
laws limit individuals' recoding options.
Hughes challenges another well-known and respected
Deconstructionist regarding this issue. Keith Aoki contends that
intellectual property laws comer cultural imagery, discouraging
borrowing for recoding purposes. 2 ' He envisions a world in which
recoding is taboo:
Through drawing the conceptual boundaries of
authorial property so expansively, these legal
borders demarcating the lines between ideas and
expression, between public good and private
property, between information as a commodity and
information as a noncommodifiable constitutive
process, a troubling geographic dynamic emerges.
Increasing aspects of our cultural imaginary are
being fenced "off-limits," as intellectual property,
marked with the equivalent of "no-trespassing"

120. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 947.
121. Property and Sovereignty, supra note 23, at 1337.
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signs.

122

Aoki is not alone in his assertions that granting authors exclusive
control may damage society's cultural evolution, 123 yet Hughes'
treatment of Aoki's warnings forces readers back into reality, as
opposed to Aoki's speculative realm.
Hughes asserts that the right to recode is alive within current
U.S. intellectual property regimes. 24 He highlights certain tools
that recoders may use to carve out exceptions to exclusive owner
control of intellectual property. Hughes' lists under the copyright
regime scenes a faire, parody, artistic freedom, general Fair Use,
and availability under "thin" copyright. 25 He notes trademark law
also has Fair Use and parody exceptions.126 Recoders may rely on
127
the public figure doctrine within the law of publicity to recode.
Hughes' persuades readers that perhaps Deconstructionists
undervalue the channels currently available for recoding within US
intellectual property laws.
Although Hughes argues that audience stability interests deserve
more attention in the debate between high-protectionists and lowprotectionists, he does not advocate recklessly placing audience
interests above those of owners. In "Recoding" Intellectual
Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, Hughes warns that
basing intellectual property laws on audience reliance interests
could have negative effects. 28 This tempered viewpoint lends
122. Id.
123. See e.g. James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright,
Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413 (1992)

(analyzing legal "treatment of information across four apparently disparate
realms: copyright, genetic information, blackmail, and insider trading");
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects to Politics: Intellectual

Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1853 (1991);
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of the Public Image: PopularCulture and
PublicityRights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125 (1993);
124. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 949.
125. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 949.
126. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 949.
127. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 949.

128. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 987-1008. See also supra notes 67-77 and
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credence to Hughes' arguments; he foresees a situation in which
his own theories could subvert when taken too far.
This Part now turns to a critique of Hughes's assertions in
"Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests. Despite his valuable contributions, Hughes has
dismissed too readily some persuasive Deconstructionist
arguments and rationale for greater recoding freedom.
B. Critiqueof Hughes
This section challenges a series of Hughes' themes, suggesting
that some Deconstructionist notions of greater recoding freedoms
may, in fact, benefit society. First, this section addresses Hughes'
hasty dismissal of Deconstructionist arguments that recoding limits
hinder marginalized groups. Next, this section confronts Hughes'
conclusions that individuals may gain more than corporations do
from intellectual property laws. Regarding Hughes discussion of
Locke's "Enough and as Good" philosophy, this section concludes
that Hughes did not advance his analysis to the level necessary to
fully appreciate Deconstructionist warnings that the public domain
may be shrinking.
1. MarginalizedGroups and Recoding - Survival of the Fittest
Hughes implies that Deconstructionists tend to focus too much
on the needs of marginalized groups, such as homosexuals and
racial minorities, to recode. 29 He does not give adequate respect
to the truth that marginalized groups' voices are often drown out
and that
recoding can provide an excellent means for
disseminating minority messages that would otherwise go unheard.
Rosemary Coombe provides a real-life example of a marginalized
group successfully recoding intellectual property:
The women of Smith College experienced a fair
accompanying text.
129. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 932.
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degree of internal social turmoil in the fall of 1990
as the college dealt with demands for increased
commitment to issues of multiculturalism and
greater sensitivity to minority experience. In a show
of community and solidarity, a number of women
made, wore, and sold T-shirts parodying the
internationally known Bennetton logo. "United
Colors of Smith" were proudly proclaimed.13 °
Glossing over the benefits provided by marginalized groups'
recoding of images and the notion that these groups do not have an
adequate voice in the U.S.,"' Hughes provides a provocative
example of his own: a gay-themed greeting card boasting the
image of American film legend John Wayne.'32 Why, asks
Hughes, should we have concern for a gay artist's recoding
freedom to "print postcards of John Wayne wearing pink lipstick
recruit who wants
but no concern for the young, heterosexual army 33
to identify with a stable image of John Wayne?"'
This author counters with, "How does the recoded image of
Wayne dilute the army recruit's preferred stable meaning?" Both
the recoded "gay" image and the American macho image of
Wayne currently coexist. Due to Wayne's enormous and lasting
popularity, there is little danger of Wayne's image as the frontier
130. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics:
Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1853,
1862 (1991).
131. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights,
Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 365, 386 (1992) (noting that marginalized groups often recode to distribute
the minority viewpoint). See also Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship
and Audience "Recoding Rights" - Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, "Beyond
Metaphor: CopyrightInfringement and the Fiction of the Work", 68 CHI.-KENT.
L. REv. 805, n. 155 (1993) (referring to Michel de Certeau, The Practice of
Everyday Life xvii, 174 (1984), "Marginality is today no longer limited to
minority groups, but is rather massive and pervasive.... Marginality is
becoming universal. A marginal group has now become a silent majority."). Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 958.
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cowboy evolving exclusively into a coded homosexual image. It is
unlikely that traditional Wayne fans will abandon their hero simply
because his image appears in some recoded messages.
Further, if a recoded gay image of Wayne were to overpower
Wayne's original, macho image, perhaps that would reflect only a
natural evolution-a market-driven survival of the fittest. The
only way for an image to lose its meaning would be for the
majority to cease asserting the predominant "stable" meaning,
bowing instead to a new recoded image. If the majority were to
abandon an image in this manner, it is only fair to expect
recycling. Throughout his Article, Hughes argues that, in most
instances, the desires of the majority should control; perhaps he
would appreciate this Darwinian logic as applied to recoding.
2. Who is the real winner-Corporationsor Individual Creators?
When faced with Deconstructionist claims that "intellectual
property laws have become principally the instruments of large
corporations," Hughes chooses to pass over that argument and to
turn, instead, to his argument that individual creators need
intellectual property laws to shield them from corporate
appropriation of their work.'34 With this choice, Hughes steps into
his own trap. He criticizes Deconstructionists for failing to
consider all aspects or possibilities of their own proposals. Here,
Hughes' skimpy consideration of the nexus between corporate
control and intellectual property laws weakens his argument.
The homogenization of message output due to corporate
broadcast consolidation is a very real threat,'35 one that Hughes
should not shrug off so readily. One author claims the passing of
the telecommunication deregulation has spurred a "merger wave"
134. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 931.
135. See David A. Curran,
Rethinking
Federal
Review
of
Telecommunication Mergers, 28 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 747 (2002) (analyzing the
complex process of telecommunication mergers); Donald R. Simon, Comment:
Big Media: It's Effect on the Marketplace of Ideas and How to Slow the Urge to
Merge, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247 (2002) (advocating
antitrust analyses of big media mergers).
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that has permanently redefined the concept of radio.136 This
commentator also notes that many station owners have benefited
because, under deregulation, they can now "capture economies of
scale" that would not comport with a regulatory scheme that
limited how many stations any one entity could own.' 37 The author
explains the negative effects of this type of hoarding:
These greater operational efficiencies, however,
have come at a price. Fewer owners have led to
fewer choices for radio listeners and hence reduced
content diversity. The consolidation wave has also
reduced ownership diversity; a smaller percentage
of radio stations are now owned by blacks and
Hispanics. Increased emphasis on the bottom line
has led many stations to abandon local
programming in favor of nationally syndicated
shows starring personalities such as Imus or
Howard Stem.' 38
Keith Aoki ties the theme of broadcast deregulation to the
intellectual property debate between high-protectionists and
Deconstructionists. He notes that, when major media entities

136. Edward D. Cavanaugh, Symposium: Are New Media Really Replacing
Old Media? Broadcast Media Deregulation and the Internet: De-regulation of
the Air Waves, Is Antitrust Enough?, 17 ST. JoHN'S J.L. CoMM. 67, 68 (Winter
2003).

137. Id.
138. Cavanaugh begins his commentary with a comment on the loss of
consumer choice due to media consolidation. He chose this poem, which
artfully demonstrates what is lost when media giants are bom:
There goes the last DJ
Who plays what he wants to play,
Says what he wants to say,
Hey! Hey! Hey!
There goes your freedom of choice.
There goes the last human voice.
There goes the last DJ.
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merge, they "create giant companies premised on copyright control
of intellectual property from conception to delivery via media links
to consumers, and presents us with the distinct prospect of creation
of private domain." '39 Hughes does acknowledge, in passing, that
corporate intellectual property benefits derived from deregulation
should prompt "scrutiny;"1 4° but this brief nod is inadequate. 4 '
3. Depletion of the Public Domain-Soon There May No Longer
be "Enough and As Good"
As established in Part II of this Article Review, Hughes rebukes
the Deconstructionist argument that, after recognition of all
controls granted by trademark, copyright, and right of publicity
laws are aggregated, there will no longer be "enough and as good"
materials available to non-owners to shape their own selfexpression.142 Hughes recognizes that intellectual property laws
will narrow the availability of some material to others; however,
he views this as a positive thing. He argues that intellectual
property laws disallow certain "borrowing" or copying, which
43
encourages artists to seek out novel, entertaining concepts.
Hughes' argument is sound on one level. It is logical to assume

139. Aoki, supra note 23, at 1347 (quoting Herbert I. Schiller, The Global
Information Highway: Projectfor an Ungovernable World, in RESISTING THE
VIRTUAL LIFE: THE CULTURE AND POLITICS OF INFORMATION 17, 22 (James
Brock & lain A. Boal eds., 1995)).
140. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 932-33.
141. Instead, Hughes focuses his energies on explaining that individual
creators use intellectual property laws to protect their conceptions from
corporate raiding. Drawing from his personal experience with the entertainment
industry, this discussion is enlightening and rings true. Yet, it does not quite
cure the defects imposed on his analysis when he merely skimmed the
Deconstructionist warnings that communications mergers may rob the public of
diverse informational channels. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 933.
142. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 968. See also notes 78-90 and
accompanying text. For another application of Lockean "enough and as good"
principles to intellectual property, see Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of
IntellectualProperty,21 HAMLINE L. REv. 65, 78-84 (1997).
143. Id.
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that many artists may choose to utilize a proven concept as
opposed to dedicating the time and energy necessary to conceive
of an original plan. Yet, to accept Hughes' reasoning, one must

also accept an implied stipulation running beneath his argumentthat, in the realm of intellectual property as opposed to real

property, there is an infinite amount of "material" that can never
This author rejects that proviso.
be permanently depleted.
Logically, one assumes that ideas and modes of expression are
infinite, unlike parcels of real property, which are clearly finite.

However, monopolization of forms of expression may grow to
such an extent that creators are effectively fenced out of the public
domain. Ideas indeed may be infinite, but valuable, effective
forms of expression may not be.'
144. Returning to Hughes' opinion that the public gains from celebrities
being forced to leave their comfort zones to seek truly novel source material,
there is a valid contrasting argument. Perhaps strict intellectual property laws
that force creators to enter new territory may have a negative societal impact as
well. The simplest way to achieve original expression is to do something that
has never been done before. Often, an artist can provide novelty of expression
by shocking audiences with previously untested sexual or violent content.
Video games are an excellent example where designers consistently push
violence levels in the name of "newness." See Michele Norris, Child's Play?
Grand Theft Auto III Provides Video Garners With a Virtual World of Extreme
at
available
NEWS,
ABC
Violence,
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/videogames02O7O1 .html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2004). An ABC news commentary critiques Grand Theft Auto
3, a mainstream, best-selling videogame:
In the video game called Grand Theft Auto III, players enter a
virtual world called Liberty City and assume the role of an
escaped criminal who hijacks cars, guns down pedestrians,
has sex with a prostitute and then earns extra points by killing
her so he can take back his money.
Id.
Grand Theft Auto 3 was the best-selling video game in both 2001 and 2002,
according to annual U.S. video game statistics, available at
http://retailindustry.about.com/library/bl/03ql/bl-npd012703.htm (last visited
Sept. 20, 2004). See also the National Organization for Women's (NOW's)
available at
content,
game's
of
the
criticism
scorching
http://www.now.org/issues/media/roundup/20020124.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2004). This example is not to imply that the only remaining novelty lies in the
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This Article Review now turns to a case example in which
recoding freedoms served as a tool for valuable minorityviewpoint expression. Without the option to recode, Alice Randall
would not have been able to pierce with such precision certain
myths perpetrated by Margaret Mitchell's Gone with the Wind.

IV. THE WIND DONE GONE - RECODING DONE RIGHT
The debate over publication of the parody The Wind Done Gone
fits squarely into Hughes' example of cases when a secondary user
wishes to recode over the objections of both the passive audience
and the owner, both of whom seek stability of meaning in the
cultural object. The cultural object at issue is Margaret Mitchell's
Gone With the Wind, a classic and well-loved 1936 American
novel, which was adapted into a 1939 award-winning movie. To
distinguish the real-life characters in this drama in a recoding
context, Alice Randall, author of The Wind Done Gone, is the
secondary user who wished to recode another's intellectual
property. The owner in this case is Margaret Mitchell's estate,
represented by Suntrust Bank, which owns the copyright to Gone
With the Wind. The estate fought a battle in the courtroom and in
the press to halt publication of Alice Randall's unique take on
Gone With The Wind. The millions of dedicated Gone With The
Wind fans comprise the, in Hughes' words, "vast, (literally) silent
'
majority who derive utility from the object's stable meanings."145
As established in Parts II and III of this Article Review, Hughes'
central thesis suggests that the needs of this majority interest in
"shock zone" or that there is no place in pop culture for gruesome, explicit

material.
Yet, advocates of reducing recoding freedoms, and thereby
diminishing materials available to authors, should consider that, perhaps, a race
for novelty might result in an unwelcome wave of low-value or even harmful
expression.
145. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 941. But cf phatomroses.com, a Gone
With the Wind fan site dedicated to recoding through fan fiction, at
http://www.phantomroses.com/apckrfan/fanfic/gwtwfic/ (last visited Sept. 20,
2004).
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stability of meaning should perhaps trump a minority, secondary
user's desire to recode. If we were to adopt Hughes' theories
without deeper inquiry, intellectual property laws would have
permanently shelved The Wind Done Gone. This section argues
that this type of recoding is an invaluable tool to promote cultural
revolution, especially when the majority, in the name of protecting
the stability of a cultural object, resists other forms of critique.
Alice Randall, via recoding, exposed the long-ignored revisionist
subtext of Gone With the Wind.'4 6 Perhaps this revelation was
uncomfortable for her bevy of fans, yet targeting an American
classic in this manner proved the best tool to spur this particular
awakening.
This Part first reviews Gone With the Wind and its immense
popularity. Next, it summarizes The Wind Done Gone, revealing
why Mitchell purists were disturbed by this retelling of life on
Tara (the plantation at the heart of Gone With the Wind). This
section then outlines the case that granted Alice Randall the
recoding freedom to publish her unauthorized parody. Finally, this
Part explores how this narrowly-won victory spurred a cultural
revolution that would have been lost if The Wind Done Gone had
never been published.
A. Gone With the Wind-An American Classic
Gone With the Wind focuses on Scarlett O'Hara, an engaging,
stubborn, Southern coquette who rises to the crippling challenges
146. While many fans may have ignored the flaws at the heart of the novel,
Mitchell's Gone with the Wind has long been criticized by journalists and
academics for its romanticized notions of Southern race relations and plantation
life. Even mainstream media classify the novel and the movie, which many
claim was gentrified, as blatantly racist.
See tvguide.com, at
http://www.tvguide.com/movies/database/ShowMovie.asp?MI=28759
(last
visited Sept. 20, 2004). This movie review of Gone With the Wind labels the
film's discourse as "essentially racist." Id. See also DARDEN ASBURY PYRON,
SOUTHERN DAUGHTER: THE LIFE OF MARGARET MITCHELL 460 (Oxford
University Press 1991). Upon the fiftieth anniversary celebration of Gone With
the Wind, the Mayor of Mitchell's native city, Atlanta, recognized publicly that
Black America had "little to celebrate in the anniversary .... " Id.
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dealt by the Civil War and by her tenuous romance with the
equally stubborn Rhett Butler. 47
Due to the 191h century
timeframe, slavery was a background theme of the book; Scarlett's48
family, rooted on the plantation "Tara," owned several slaves.
This evocative, compelling tale is arguably the most popular
literary fiction in American history-America's dedication to
Scarlett, Rhett, and the host of characters from "Tara" is evidenced
by the astronomical sales figures. Since its 1936 publication,
Gone With the Wind book sales have been eclipsed only by sales
49
of the Bible. 1
Some argue that Margaret Mitchell's story romanticized notions
of slavery and race relations in the Civil War era South. For
example, biracial slave children fathered by plantation owners
were commonplace in the South, 5° yet Gone With the Wind
eclipsed this reality. One wife of a Confederate leader addressed
the issue of slave owners' biracial children in her journal:
Like the patriarchs of old, our men live all in one
house with their wives and their concubines; and
the mulattoes one sees in every family partly
resemble the white children. Any lady is ready to
tell you who is the father of the mulatto children in
everybody else's household but her own. Those,
147. See generally MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936
Macmillian).
148. Id.
149. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.
2001). The Internet has provided a welcome medium for Gone With the Wind
devotees, see the following active fan sites from around the globe: at
http://www.jah.ne.jp/-stamp/GWTW.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2004);
http://www.shucks.net/shucks/HOMEPAGE/GWTW.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2004).
150. Experts on women in slavery note: "Wherever a white wife knew or
sensed that her husband had sexual contact with black women, she was likely to
feel humiliated. Often the white wife lived in close proximity to her husband's
mistress and the mulatto half sisters and brothers of her own children." CAROL
HYMOWITZ AND MICHELE WEISSMMAN, A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 61
(Bantam Books 1978).
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she seems to think, drop from clouds. 5 '
Alice Randall was driven by Mitchell's exclusion of such hard
realities to produce her own parody, The Wind Done Gone.
B. The Wind Done Gone-Cynara'sVoice
Randall explains her motivation for crafting The Wind Done
Gone succinctly in her Acknowledgements, "Margaret Mitchell's
novel Gone With the Wind inspired me to think." '52 And Randall's
book encouraged Gone with the Wind fans to think as well, over
the objections of Mitchell's estate. The publication of this book
catapulted a small cultural revolution; this would not have been
possible had Alice Randall not won the power to recode a classic
novel.
The Wind Done Gone retells Mitchell's story"5 3 from the
perspective of a biracial slave.'54 Cynara, the protagonist, is
Scarlett's half-sister and Mammy is Cynara's birth mother. Scarlett
and Cynara share a father-the white plantation owner whom
Cynara calls "Planter." Cynara is proud, beautiful, and watchful.
She refers to Scarlett only as "Other," implying that Scarlett is a
dramatic, spoiled soul who unfairly monopolizes Mammy's
attentions:
Even Other called Mammy out of her name. Other,
who loved my mother; Other, who ran to her
Mammy like I never seen nobody run to anybody,
or anything, for the more significant the matter, ran
to Mammy like she was couch and pillow, blanket
and mattress, prayer and God.'55

151. See id. at 61 (discussing the sexual triangle of slavery between white

women, white men, and black slave women).
152. ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE 210 (Houghton Mifflin 2001).
153. MITCHELL, supra note 145.
154. See generally RANDALL, supra note 152.
155. RANDALL, supra note 152, at 7.
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Cynara and Scarlett have other loves in common as well.
Perhaps most vexing to Gone With The Wind fans is Randall's
revealing of a love triangle between Rhett, Scarlett, and Cynara.' 56
Cynara refers to her devoted lover only as "R." According to
Cynara, Rhett had always loved her first and was willing to cast
aside Scarlett for Cynara without hesitation. The passionate, tense
love between Scarlett and Rhett is a mainstay of Gone With the
Wind. By introducing the possibility that Rhett never truly cared
for Scarlet and was merely using her deflates Mitchell's epic,
which understandably upsets fans who would like the meaning of
Gone With the Wind to remain stable.
Another "revelation" of life on Tara also skewed Mitchell's
version. Cynara tells tales of her unorthodox, close relationship to
"Lady," Scarlett's birth mother. In Cynara's version, she was
forced to seek comfort from Lady because Scarlett had
monopolized Mammy. Lady also yearned to be a mother:
Lady made herself comfortable in her rocking chair.
"Are you hungry?" I nodded. She handed me the
glass of milk. I hesitated. "You can drink it." I
took the glass and drank. She took the glass from
my hand and drank right after me. I was surprised.
Really I was astounded.'57
Cynara goes on to explain how she started nursing from Lady
regularly," 8 forming an uncommon bond with the legal wife of her
own father.'59

156. See discussion of slavery's sexual triangle supra notes 150 and 151.
157. RANDALL,SUpra note 152, at 15.
158. The character Cynara notes that:
She pulled me on to her lap and I suckled at her breast till her
warm milk filled me. As always, it was a cheering surprise
for both of us. We had been sharing these little spurred-byenvy suppers all my memory... Later, when I slept beside
her, she said, 'You're my little girl, aren't you?'
RANDALL, supra note 152, at 16.
159. See discussion supra note 152.
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Suntrust Bank resisted Randall's blatant recodings. The efforts
were successful at the district court level; a judge issued a
preliminary injunction against publication of The Wind Done
Gone.160 Later, the Appellate Court reversed, 1 ' freeing Randall and
Houghton Mifflin to publish. In the midst of appeal, Suntrust and
Houghton Mifflin settled the lawsuit, 62 cementing The Wind Done
Gone 's place in literary history.
C. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.-A Victory for
Recoding Freedom
In Suntrust, Margaret Mitchell's estate claimed that The Wind
Done Gone infringed the copyright of Gone With the Wind.
Suntrust objected to Randall's copying of core characters,
character traits, and relationships from Gone With the Wind.'63
Suntrust also claimed that Randall infringed by copying famous
scenes, plot elements, and verbatim dialogues. 64
Randall
successfully countered this claim, convincing the court that her
novel critiques (not copies) Mitchell's depiction of slave politics
and the atmosphere of the American South during the Civil War.'6 5
Randall sought shelter in the Fair Use Doctrine found within the
Copyright Act. 16 6 The Appellate Court first established that The
160. SuntrustBank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
161. Id.
162. The confidential settlement terms called for Houghton Mifflin to donate
a certain amount to Morehouse College, a primarily black educational institution
of higher education. Both parties maintain the correctness of their arguments.
Press Release, Houghton Mifflin Books, Settlement Reached Regarding The
Wind Done Gone (May 9, 2002) (on file with author).
163. SuntrustBank, 268 F.3d at 1259.
164. Houghton Mifflin denied that The Wind Done Gone employed verbatim,
copied dialogue. Id.
165. Id.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 107 codifies the Fair Use exception to copyright. The
Section provides:
§ 107.
Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
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Wind Done Gone was of a "parodic character," as required by
Supreme Court precedent.' 67 The court grappled with the definition
of "parody," finally adopting this standard: a work is a "parody if
its aim is to comment upon or criticize a prior work by
appropriating elements of the original in creating a new artistic, as
opposed to scholarly or journalistic, work."'68 Under this standard,
the court held that The Wind Done Gone clearly qualified as of "a
parodic character."' 69 The court next weighed the four elements of
a Fair Use analysis.
Under the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the
court noted that Randall chose a form of publication that would
generate profit, making this work of a commercial nature. 7 ' Yet,
the court stated that the highly transformative nature of Randall's
novel downplays the commercial element.'7 ' Randall used a firstreproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id.
167. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268 (referring to Campbell V. Acuff-Rose
Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994)).
168. Id. at 1268-69.
169. Id. at 1269.
170. Id. at 1269.
171. The Court cited Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994): "The more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism, that may way against a finding of fair use. The goal of
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person viewpoint of a slave to tell her story; she employed an
abbreviated writing style different from Mitchell's. 172 The court
concluded that this first factor fell in favor of a finding of fair
use. 173

In consideration of the second factor, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the Suntrust court held that the nature of the
copyrighted work was not key to the analysis. The nature of the
copyrighted work recognizes that original, creative works shall
receive a greater scope of protection from copying than derivative
works or factual compilations. 174 Courts give little weight to this
factor when considering a parody defense "since parodies almost
invariably copy publicly known, expressive works."' 75 The third
factor, however, is central to a parody analysis.
The court faced a difficult task when considering the third
factor; it admitted that it could not determine conclusively whether
the quantity and quality of the borrowed material reasonably
related to the purpose of the copying.'76 The Wind Done Gone
goes past the point of merely conjuring up Gone With the Wind,
the Court noted;' 77 however, how far past this point of "conjuring
up" may a parody wander without entering infringement territory?
The law does not limit parodists to taking the "bare minimum"
required to conjure up the original work.'78 Yet, Suntrust did not
answer whether Randall's copying would have tipped this factor in
favor of copyright infringement; hence, this factor did not favor
either side. Instead, the court turned to the fourth factor to cinch
its case for fair use.
To review the fourth factor, the effect on the market value of the

copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation
of transformative works." Id. at 1269.
172. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1270.
173. Id. at 1271. The Court noted that it would be impossible for Randall to

parody the original work without using its elements. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1271 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994)).
176. Id. at 1273-74.
177. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1273.

178. Id.
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original, courts ask whether the publication of the parody will
negatively impact the market for the original work, including
potential harm for future derivative works. 79 Suntrust claimed that
The Wind Done Gone would harm the market for future derivative
works of Gone With the Wind. To buttress its argument, Suntrust
pointed to its history of authorizing derivative works, such as the
well-known movie and book, Scarlett: The Sequel.180 Yet, the court
dismissed Suntrust's evidence as too diffuse because it skirted the
primary issue-whether The Wind Done Gone would serve as a
"market substitution" for Gone With the Wind. The Court relied
on Houghton Mifflin's evidence that The Wind Done Gone was
unlikely to displace sales of Gone With the Wind. Thus, the fourth
factor of the Fair Use analysis weighed in favor of a finding of
18
parody. 1
The Court concluded that The Wind Done Gone was a fair use of
a copyrighted work and reversed the lower court's preliminary
injunction against publication.182 This decision, coupled with the
settlement between Houghton Mifflin and Suntrust, guaranteed
that readers would hear Cynara's tale of life on Tara.
D. Cultural Change Spurred by Recoding in
The Wind Done Gone
After Cynara officially found her voice, critics were prolific in
the review of The Wind Done Gone and offered Randall's work a
mix of praise and cutting reviews. One reviewer called the Wind
'
Done Gone "unimaginative, trite, filled with literary cliches."183
The reviewer continues her criticism:
Alice Randall's "Unauthorized Parody" of Gone
with the Wind is nothing a parody should be. It
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 1274-75.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1277.

183. The Wind Done Gone, The Virginia Quarterly Review Vol. 78, Issue 1

(Winter 2002).
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is ...

narrated in a style entirely unsuited to the

material. While there are some passages with vivid
descriptions and truly lyrical prose, they are, sadly,
few and far between. The book's stated purpose is
to "explode the mythology perpetrated by a
Southern classic," but this is not accomplished. The
fact that Cynara, the heroine of the book, is the
illegitimate daughter of Scarlett's (in this book,
"Other's") father bv Mammy raises some
interesting questions about racial identity, but these
questions are not explored to the extent that would
make them provocative."
Perhaps this reviewer was an audience member hoping to preserve
the book's original, stable meaning. Other reviewers were kinder
in their assessments of Randall's endeavors.
Regardless of whether readers believed the book to be a literary
success, Randall's use of recoding did ingenue a small cultural
revolution regarding a classic American novel. She forced readers
to consider Mitchell's passing racist narrative, for example, that
both whites and blacks benefited from a system of slavery. The
Suntrust court highlighted one such passage from Gone With the
Wind:
The more I see of emancipation the more criminal I
think it is. It's just ruined the darkies," says Scarlett
O'Hara. Free blacks are described as "creatures of
small

intelligence ...

like

monkeys

or

small

children turned loose among treasured objects
whose Value is beyond their comprehension, they
ran wild - either from perverse pleasure in
destruction or simply because of their ignorance." 5
Undoubtedly, Mitchell was a beloved and talented author; fans

184. Id.
185. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1273 (citing MITCHELL, 654).
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extol her work through a variety of forms. Yet, her racist leanings
have often been dismissed as merely a product of the time. As
noted by Mr. Carlton Moss in an open letter to Gone With the
Wind's movie producer, David 0. Selznick, Mitchell's epic
reiterates two themes common to anti-abolitionist theory: (1) that
black men and women did not actually want freedom; and (2) that
black men and women did not possess the "innate" ability to
manage their own affairs independently.'86 Now, due to the
recoding found within The Wind Done Gone, perhaps Mitchell's
audience will face an uncomfortable truth: Gone With the Wind,
while an engaging story, is considered by many to be insulting
revisionist history.

187

The type of recoding freedom exhibited by The Wind Done
Gone is vital to a healthy discourse of ideas. In his Article,
Hughes overlooked or simply did not anticipate the good that
could come from this type of recoding. To ensure that future
recodings similar to Randall's The Wind Done Gone are able to
reach the marketplace, legislators should clarify and expand
doctrines of Fair Use throughout intellectual property regimes.

186. Carlton Moss, An Open Letter to Mr. Selznick, in Gone With the Wind
as Book and Film 156-59 (Richard Harwell ed., 1983).
187. Margaret Mitchell was a Southern woman in the early 2 0 th Century and,

as we all are, was a "product of her time." However, Mitchell may not deserve
the full coverage of this convenient shield. There is well-documented evidence
that, beyond her novel, Mitchell espoused bigoted beliefs in her personal life.
See Thomas Cripps, Winds of Change, in

RECASTING: GONE WITH THE WIND IN

140 (Darden Asbury Pyron ed., 1983) (claiming that
Margaret Mitchell revered the racist Thomas Dixon and, despite loving her own
black servants, "believed the Ku Klux Klan to be a historic necessity."). See
AMERICAN CULTURE

also DARDEN

ASBURY PYRON, SOUTHERN DAUGHTER: THE LIFE OF MARGARET

84 (Oxford University Press 1991) (relating a story in which "Peg"
Mitchell, then a student at the northern Smith College, transferred out of her
MITCHELL

history class to avoid sharing the classroom with one of Smith's few black
students). But see PYRON, supra, at 414-17 (relating praise for Mitchell's
kindness and generosity, given by Mitchell's servant Bessie Johnson).
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"RECODING WITHIN REASON"

In our litigious, pro-property society, authors may hesitate
before publicly issuing critique or commentary of another's work.
As Part IV of this Article Review established, dynamic criticism is
fundamental to preserving a healthy dialogue. This is not true only
for literary circles. Beyond copyright, critics may choose to target
works protected by trademark or publicity rights. To encourage
parodies and other commentary on works protected by intellectual
property laws, law makers should expand the current copyright
Fair Use Doctrine, clarify the boundaries of the Public Person
Doctrine, and further develop a statutory Fair Use exception for
trademark law. This, coupled with a healthy respect for discourse,
will clear room for "recoding within reason."
A. ClarifyingCopyright FairUse
As evidenced by the court's maneuvering of the copyright Fair
Use doctrine in Suntrust, the parameters of this exception are not
entirely clear. The current four-factor test is valuable and
instructive, yet, especially when testing parodies, it causes
confusion. The Suntrust court noted that reviewing alleged
parodies presents courts with a problem because parody's brand of
humor requiresthat viewers be able to conjure up the original. 8 A
parody gains effectiveness as it moves closer to copying the
original. A parody would lose its punch, be it humorous or
satirical, if it only managed to refer indirectly to an original.
Parodic success depends on the ability to appropriate a substantial
portion of the original work.
As society, courts, and the legislature currently acknowledge
that parody is a valuable form of responsive criticism, the
copyright Fair Use analysis should recognize its unique nature.
The third copyright Fair Use factor, the amount and substantiality
of the portion used, should expressly provide greater freedom to
188. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271-72.
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appropriate from the original for the situation of parodies, without
injuring the potential for a finding of fair use.
B. Expanding the Statutory TrademarkFair Use Exception
Trademarks are the primary means of corporate communication;
they are omnipresent in this age of marketing and mass
consumption. The meaning behind trademarks often evolves
beyond the original intention of its corporate parent to represent a
more global theme. For example, many argue that Coke's
trademarks represent globalization or that the Benetton trademark
represents racial and cultural unity beyond the Benetton product
line. Yet, when secondary users attempt to recode these images to
disseminate a different message, even if it is social commentary,
they will likely face trademark infringement actions." 9
Perhaps trademark owners, like celebrities, should accept a
degree of intrusion as a price for their fame. The Public Figure
Doctrine awards celebrities, who court fame and attention, only a
narrow screen of protection from public scrutiny. As celebrities
invest time, money, creativity, and effort to formulate a public
persona, trademark owners do the same to produce famous, wellknown marks.
The public, through consumerism, makes
trademarks famous; therefore, perhaps the public should have
greater latitude to critique, satirize, or parody these powerful
signals, especially where there is negligible danger of consumer
confusion.'90
This author does not advocate unfettered freedom to recode;
instead, she believes US laws should expand and more clearly

189. See Coombs, supra note 131 and accompanying text (relating attempts
by Smith College students to recode the Benetton trademark as a social
message).
190. See infra Part V.3 and the accompanying notes for a discussion on
expansion of the public figure doctrine. Also, it is important to note that
intellectual property owners do not have proprietary rights equivalent to the
rights of real property owners; the touchstone of trademark rights is consumer
confusion. Therefore, if consumers are unlikely to be confused, courts should
offer more leeway for trademark parodies.
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delineate the boundaries of acceptable recoding. Secondary users
should be able to discern from trademark law whether their use is
likely to be held an infringement of a trademark owner's rights. 9 '
The Lanham Act does currently provide a narrow statutory Fair
Use exception for descriptive uses of a trademark, 15 U.S.C.
§1115 (b)(4) provides that use is not infringement in cases:
(4) That the use of the name, term, or device
charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise
than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his
own business, or of the individual name of anyone
in privity with such party, or of a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good
faith only to describe the goods or services of such
party, or their geographic origin.9 2
Case law has clarified this trademark Fair Use exception
somewhat, but the perimeters are still murky and subjective.'93 A
primary case regarding this trademark Fair Use exception,
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc.,"' concluded that
this defense was "available only in actions involving descriptive
terms and only when the term is used in its descriptive sense rather
than its trademark use."' 95 This narrow statutory defense restricts
191. See Karen Levey, NOTE: Trademark Parody: A Conflict Between
Constitutionaland Intellectual Property Interests, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 425
(March 2001) (advocating for clarity in the case of trademark parodies).
192. 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4).
193. Current U.S. trademark law does address Fair Use exceptions to
infringement claims. These defenses include a statutory defense, a parody
defense, a nominative use defense, and permissive comparative advertising.
The narrow statutory allowance and extensive case law, however, does not
combine to form a logical path for courts to take when assessing trademark fair
use. For an illustrative discussion of all realms of trademark Fair Use, see Baila
H.
Celadonia,
Trademark Fair Use
(Sep.
1,
1996)
at
http://www.cll.com/articles/article.cfm?articleid=32 (last visited Sept. 20,
2004).
194. 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
195. Id. at 791 (citing Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F. 2d 1178, 1185
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unfairly those who wish to recode within reason.
An expanded statutory trademark Fair Use doctrine could
possibly mimic the base of the copyright Fair Use doctrine, with
appropriate tweaking to accommodate for the change in the types
of intellectual property at issue. For example, the first factor, the
purpose and the character of (the allegedly infringing) work could
ask two questions when considering the use: (1) Does this use
respond directly to activity perpetrated by the mark's owners? or
(2) Does the use employ the image in a broader manner to combat
ideals not associated to the trademark owner? Uses responding
directly to the trademark owner should be given greater fair use
latitude, yet a positive answer to the second should not absolutely
preclude Fair Use.
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, would
not necessarily be instructive in a trademark Fair Use analysis. As
with copyright and parody, the work employed will almost always
be well-known and protected by state and federal trademark laws.
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of portion used, is
key to the analysis. As in copyright Fair Use considerations,
courts could look to whether the secondary users injected
transformative elements into the mark's contextual setting to
convey their particular message. The more transformative a work
is, the more likely it should be labeled trademark Fair Use.
The fourth and final factor, the effect on the market value of the
original, should be the most heavily weighted factor in a trademark
Fair Use analysis. The central inquiry in a copyright Fair Use
analysis is whether the allegedly infringing work might serve as a
market substitute for the original.'96
In a trademark Fair Use analysis, courts could ask whether the
defendant's widespread conduct could potentially harm the
livelihood of plaintiff s business. To apply this reasoning to a
trademark situation, courts should first look to the range of
distribution. Is this a national campaign or a local uprising?
Smaller, localized uses should point to Fair Use. National uses
(5th Cir. 1980).
196. Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1274-75 (citing MITCHELL, 654).
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may also qualify as Fair Use, yet they should be scrutinized for
potential damage to defendant through consumer confusion.
Beyond trademark Fair Use, legislators should clarify the public
figure doctrine to acknowledge recoding within reason.
C. Expansion of the PublicFigureDoctrine
Famous people generate public interest, therefore current
intellectual property laws allow for the exhaustive reporting,
criticisms, and day-by-day accounts of celebrity activities. Yet, if
one is a not a superstar, in the sphere of Madonna, Jennifer
Aniston, or Brittany Spears, it may not be entirely clear whether
that person is fair game for public criticism.
A recent case exemplifies this fine line. In December of 2003,
the Texas Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of New
Times, Inc. v. Isaaks.197 This case examines the issue of parody in
the context of ridiculing judges and prosecutors. When using the
parody format to criticize these public servants, who are not
superstars accustomed to the intrusive commentary, what rules
must publishers follow? The law is unclear, as The New York
Times recently discovered.
In 1999, Texas Judge Darlene Whitten responded to 13-year-old
Christopher Beamon's Halloween essay outlining the shooting of a
teacher and classmates with a 5-day jail sentence.198 District
Attorney Bruce Isaacks made the decision to charge Beamon for
his gruesome prose.199
In response to the unorthodox case, the New York Times
published a parody criticizing both Whitten's and Isaacks'
actions."° The story was titled, "Stop the Madness" and reported
that Isaacks had brought charges against a six-year-old girl for
197. Julie Hilden, CNN.com, Texas Supreme Court's Libel-by-Fiction Case:
A
Key
First Amendment
Controversy (Dec.
12,
2003),
at
http://www.cnn.com/2OO3/LA W/12/12/findlaw.analysis.hilden.libel/index.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2004).

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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writing a book report on "Where the Wild Things Are." ''
According to the report, Whitten had jailed the girl for this offense,
after detaining her in handcuffs and shackles.0 2
Plaintiffs argued the public could easily have taken the fictitious
account as truth, damaging the plaintiffs' reputations.2 3 Plaintiffs
also contended that defendants' retraction was inadequate. On
November 18, the paper published the following article retraction
in response to requests from Whitten's attorney: "Here's a clue for
our cerebrally-challenged readers who thought the story was real:
It wasn't. It was a joke. We made it up. Not even Judge Whitten,
we hope, would throw a 6-year-old girl in the slammer for writing
a book report. Not yet, anyway." 2"
The defendants did not back down after the plaintiffs ran this
comment.
Instead, the two sides battled in court over the line
between free speech and libel regarding a parody.20 6
The Public Figure Doctrine should contain ample room for
criticism of public servants, including judges and prosecutors.
Public servants realize their calling will thrust them into the public
eye and expose them to criticism. While the particular retraction in
this Texas case may have been in bad taste, and therefore the
catalyst to subsequent litigation, the parodic nature of the original
publication should not be forgotten. Instead of relying on standard
reporting techniques, this journalist employed a more creative and
powerful form of criticism: the parody. Those public figures that
fall short of superstar status should certainly be able to deflect
invalid criticism or false statements with a shield of libel laws.
Yet, the Public Figure Doctrine should clarify what factors could
lead to libel via parodic criticism as opposed to muffling potential
parodists of public servants with the threat of litigation.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Hilden, supra note 197.
Hilden, supra note 197.
Hilden, supra note 197.
Hilden, supra note 197.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Justin Hughes'
"Recoding" Intellectual Property and
Overlooked Audience Interests is a valuable work to the discourse
between high protectionists and Deconstructionists. As a whole,
Hughes' assertions that most people prefer stability of meaning of
cultural objects and his critique of Deconstructionist arguments for
restriction of intellectual property protections are thought
provoking and well-grounded.
Yet, in his Article, Hughes
dismisses some valid Deconstructionist arguments for recoding
rights that deserve further consideration. The case example of The
Wind Done Gone illustrates how recoding freedom can spur a
passive audience into realizing a previously unacknowledged
viewpoint valuable to social discourse.
In the spirit of recoding within reason, this Article Review
concludes that U.S. legislators should expand copyright Fair Use,
allowing parodists greater latitude to borrow from the primary
source in order to criticize, mock, and comment effectively. As
The Wind Done Gone exemplifies, borrowing heavily from the
original work in a direct response allows for sharper, more
effective parody and does not unfairly usurp the copyright owner's
potential market.
Due to the omnipresence and power of trademarks, legislators
should also expand the statutory trademark Fair Use exception,
using a refined form of the copyright Fair Use test as a model.
This trademark Fair Use expansion would recognize the rights of
the public, within reason, to criticize and make social commentary
using the marks that their own consumerism has made famous.
Specifically, allowing localized, transformative works such as the
Smith College women's trademark-borrowing t-shirt to protest
accepted school standards contributes to useful social commentary
and protects the marginalized minority recognized by
Deconstructionists. This type of commentary using a mark to send
a message does not pose a serious threat to the trademark's
strength, to the owner's rights, or to consumers.
Finally, lawmakers should clarify the Public Figure Doctrine to
allow for reasonable critique of public servants, such as judges and
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commentators, which is in accordance with their level of
responsibility to the public.
These proposed amendments to current intellectual property
protections and other doctrines will not leave owners vulnerable to
unfair uses of their intellectual property or leave consumers
vulnerable to confusion. Instead, these proposals consider a range
of interests, noted by both Hughes and Deconstructionists, to strike
a balance that allows recoding within reason.
Sarah La Voi*

* Sarah La Voi graduated from DePaul University College of Law and Kellstadt
Graduate School of Business with a joint Juris Doctor/Masters of Business
Administration in May 2004. I would like to thank Professor Roberta
Rosenthall Kwall for challenging and inspiring me, the DePaul Intellectual
Property Program for providing an excellent forum for academic development,
and the DePaulArt and EntertainmentLaw Journalfor valuable editorial input.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

59

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

230

DEPAULJ.ART.&ENT.LAW

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol14/iss2/2

[Vol.XIV: 171

60

